TRADE AND CIRCUSES: EXPLAINING URBAN GIANTS
Introduction
Over 35 percent of Argentina's population is concentrated in Buenos Aires, a city of 12 million inhabitants. What is it about countries such as Argentina, Japan and Mexico that justifies their urban concentration when the United States' largest city contains only 6 percent of its population? We investigate the causes of urban primacy using evidence from a cross-section of 85 modem countries and five case studies (classical Rome, 1650 London, 1700 Edo, Buenos Aires in 1900 and Mexico City today). We find that concentration in the nation's largest city falls with total population and with the share of labor employed in agriculture. As predicted by ICrugman and Livas (19921, countries with high shares of trade in GDP, or low tariff barriers (even holding trade levels constant), rarely have their population concentrated in a single city.
Urban centralization also falls with the development of transportation networks.
But political %rces. even more than economic factors, drive urban centralization: dictatorships cause concentration in a single metropolis. Political instability also increases central city size. Figure 1 summarizes our findings that both political weakness and centralized power lead to centralized urban populations. One interpretation of these results is that unstable regimes must cater to mobs near the center of power and dictatorships freely exploit the wealth of the hinterland.
Our work has some significant predecessors: Wheaton and Shishido (19811 and Rosen and Resnick (1980) show that urban concentration is negatively associated with the country's population. They also find that concentration is first increasing and then decreasing in per capita GDP. Henderson 119861 and Wheaton and Sbishido [19811 show across a small sample of countries that concentration of government expenditures and non-federalist governments both lead to urban concentration.' Using data on Western European cities from 1000 to 1800 C.E., De Long and Shleifer (19931 demonstrate that urban growth (not urban concentration)
is the product of non-absolutist regimes that respect property rights.
Our next section presents our basic hypotheses. Section 111 describes the data and Section IV presents the results. Section V presents our case studies of megalopolises. Section VI concludes.
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II. Alternative Theories of Urban Giants
In this section, we discuss three forces driving the concentration of urban population in a single city: trade and commerce, industry, and government. We also set up our estimation strategy.
Trade and Commerce
Urban theorists from von Thunen [1826] to Krugman [1991] have argued that when transportation is expensive activities will group together to save on travel costs. This theory predicts that urban concentration will be higher when transportation is more costly.1 ICrugman and Livas [1992] use this idea to suggest a link between protectionism and the growth of Mexico City. In their model, international firms supply the main city and the hinterland equally well. Domestic firms pay lower transport costs when serving their own location; domestic prices, net of travel, are lower where domestic firms are concentrated. When tariffs are low, imported goods are a large part of consumption. Imports are not cheaper in the central city so workers spread over space to save congestion costs. With protection, domestic suppliers cake over the market.
Prices, net of transport costs, are lower for domestic goods in the central city because firms locate in that city. Workers then come to the city to pay lower prices for domestic goods.' This theory predicts that protectionism generates larger central cities.
Of course free trade does not always decrease urban concentration. Among our case studies, London and Buenos Aires are trade cities that grew through commerce. We can therefore test the Krugman and Livas's hypothesis of a negative correlation between trade and concentration against an alternative hypothesis that central cities have a comj,arative advantage in commerce and grow with the volume of trade.
2.2, Industry
Activities, such as agriculture, which depend on immobile natural resources will not be able to relocate to reap the benefits from being in the capital. The extent to which an economy is agricultural thus limits 2 the extent to which that economy can centralize In one location. This basic argument suggests that any movement away from agriculture will raise urban centralization, but when it Is also true that aggregate demand is the linchpin of industrialization, as In Murphy, Shleifer and Vislmy (1989) , then industrial growth particularly raises the benefits of concentrating population. Centralizing population lowers transport costs and raises effective aggregate demand fix a fixed level of GDP. If the level of demand is more important lbr the growth of industry than & the growth of services ecause of fixed costs in manufacturing), then the greater demand created by urban centralization may be tied to industrial expansion.
Industrialization creates a farther Incentive fbr finns to congregate If Industrialization increases the need for physical infrastructure and infrastructure costs can be shared by firms located in the same city.
Manufacturing may also increase the need for intellectual spillovers that are only available in the central city (perhaps those caused by diversity as in Glaeser a a!. (19921 or from access to the pool of international human capital). Large cities also allow finns to specialize in a thinner range of products, as they provide larger markets for these specialized products. We test the positive relationship between manufacturing and concentration predicted by the above theories against an alternative hypothesis in which manufacturing only affects urbanization and not concentration.
Government and Politics
Politics affects urban concentration because spatial proximity to power increases political influence.
Political actors from revolutionaries in 1789 to lobbyists in 1994 have increased their clout by working in the capital. Distance can lessen influence in many ways: (1) when influence comes from the threat of violence, distance makes that violence less direct, (2) distance makes illegal political actions (e.g. bribes)
harder to conceal, (3) political agents living in the hinterland have less access to information and (4) distance hurts communication between political agents and government. The political power of the capital's population should induce the government to transfer resources to the capital and these transfers will attract migrants. Rent-seekers coming to the capital may also raise the city's population.' S The political power of the capital's residents is most important when governments (1) are weak and respond easily to local pressure. (2) have large rents to dispense, and (3) do not respect the political rights of the hinterland. Effect (1) predicts that instability will create urban concentration since buying off local agitators is most important in susceptible regimes.
Instability may also create concentration if weak governments are unable or unwilling to protect life and property outside of the capital. Effects (2) and (3) suggest that dictatorships will have more concentration since they are willing to ignore the wishes of the politically weak hinterland. Dictators may also have more rents to dispense. We test the positive connection of dictatorship and instability with urban concentration against an alternative hypothesis where dictatorship and instability lead governments to protect themselves by moving the seat of power away from the central city (and thus lessening concentration), or by controlling migration (as in Stalinist Russia or Communist China) to disperse population across space.
A Model of Government and Politics
This model formally connects the type of political regime (dictatorships vs. democracy) and the degree of political instability with the size of the central city. We examine the spatial structure of taxation chosen by a government eating legal political pressure from the electorate and revolutionary political pressure from mobs in the capital city. Our main results are that (I) more dictatorial regimes have higher taxes in the hinterland (because dictators ignore the rights of the median voter who resides in the hinterland) and (2) more unstable regimes lower taxes in the capital (because unstable regimes are vulnerable to agitation by mobs near the seat of power). We divide each country into two locations: the main city and the hinterland. Migration between locations is assumed to be costless. Total population in the country is normalized to one. Wages In each location (including amenities, psychic income and income from household production) are assumed to be locally declining in that location's population because of congestion. Taxes are lump-sum and may vary across space.
The assumption of costless migration implies that after-tax wages will be equalized across locations, or
where N is the population of the central city, TI is the tax level (net of benefits) in region I (fbr 1=1,2), where region 1 is the central city, and fl) Is location specific, continuously differentiable wage functions, with W,<O due to congestion. Applying the implicit function theorem to equation (1) defines a population function:
where N'Q<O, from W,Q< 0. The population of the central city depends on the difference in the tax rates across space.
The government takes (2) as given, and chooses r, and r, to maximize
where V is a parameter measuring the value of survival, and 1-rRft,)-eEft,) describes the probability of surviving to next period. rRfr,) is the probability of a violent, or illegal, revolt where r is a shift parameter capturing the propensity of the country to revolt or the level of instability. The probability of a revolt starting and succeeding is assumed to be a function of the degree of exploitation in the central city (ri), because we assume that only revolts in the capital can be successful.' eE(r) is the probability of a successful legal, or electoral, change of government.' The election function is based on the taxes facing the median voter (2 as long as we assume that 50 percent of the population live in the hinterland). e is a shift parameter measuring the power of the electorate; low c's indicate dictatorship. In equation (3), the government faces a trade-off between current rents and future survival when choosing the levels of taxes in each location.
The government maximizes (3) over r, and t, subject to (2). The first order conditions are given by -Vea+M;-r1)+ 
8;
We assume that the second order conditions hold. Our interest here is how the difference between the tax rates (r, -r,. which determines N, the size of the central city) responds to democracy (e) and revolutionary instability (r).
It is simple to show that the gap between exploitation of the hinterland and taxes in central city (I) falls with the degree of democracy and (2) rises with the degree of instability. Essentially, instability makes it more dangerous to tax the capital city, since the capital become more prone to violence. Taxing the hinterland is a more expensive activity *,r the government when democracy has empowered those voters.
Since democracy and stability both lower the tax differences over space, they will also lower the central city's population.
It is also straightforward to prove that instability is & more important in democracies than in dictatorships
The intuition for this effect is that there are two forces limiting taxation of the hinterland: (1) democracy, and (2) the movement of population in the hinterland to the capital. When democracy is strong, the tax rate on the hinterland is initially low so new taxes on the hinterland (created by more instability) will have a smaller migration effect than they would if the tax rate on the hinterland were initially high.
Estimation Stratetv
Our empirical strategy is basically an estimation of equation (I) 
where the i/s are national characteristics that change the incentives to Live in different locations. Equation (6) is justified by a model, but it also has intuitive appeal. This estimation can be interpreted as finding the factors determining the size of the main city holding the population of the other urbanized areas and the hinterland constant. By moving ln(N_) or ln(N,) over to the other side of (6) that we analyze, agglomerations that in 1985 had 2 million or more inhabitants grew faster than the world's total population. While large agglomerations in the developed world grew at an average of 1.0 percent per year, their counterparts in the less developed world grew at an average rate of 3.3 percent per year. Table I shows the five largest and five smallest main cities of the world first ranked by absolute population and then ranked by share of their country's population. Ranking by either measure, three of the five largest main cities in the world are in less developed countries. Ml of the smaller cities are in less developed countries. The correlation between absolute population and share of country's population is far from perfect.
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Shanghai is one of the world's most populated main cities when ranked by its raw population and one oldie world's teat populated main cities when ranked by its share of China's population. The southern cone of South America seems particularly prone to urban concentration; three of the five most concentrated countries in the world are there.
IV.-Results Table II gives the means and standard deviations for the sample that we use in our regressions. Table   III shows the raw correlations of our variables. Higher levels of central city population were positively associated with larger and more populated countries, high levels of per capita GOP, and high shares of the labor thrce outside of agriculture. Central city population is negatively correlated with the presence of dictatorships, the share of trade in GOP, and the share of government transportation and communication expenditures in GDP. The growth rate of main city population Is positively associated with dictatorships.
revolutions and coups, and high tariff barriers. The correlations also show a strong correlation between trade and politics which creates the possibility that trade and political effects might be confused empirically.
We use the log of average population in the main city as the dependent variable in most of our regressions.
MI regressions include the same set of controls: a capital city dummy that takes a value oft if the main city in question is a capital city and 0 otherwise, the log of average non-urbanized population, the log of average urbanized populatioi outside of the main city, the log of average real per capita GDP, and the log of land area. Unless otherwise specified, all of our regressions report OLS results, with standard errors based on White's heteroskedasticlty-cOnsisteflt covarlance matrix In parenthese&'°R egression (I) includes our standard set of controls and the share of the labor force outside of agriculture.
The regression explains 80 percent of the total variation in the dependent variable. In regression (1), the capital city dummy is positive and significant. The coefficient ott this variable indicates that main cities are, on average, 42 percent larger if they are also capital cities. This faa may mean that power attracts population, but It may also mean that capitals are located In larger cities. Bothpopulation controls also take positive values, but only the log of non-urbanized population is large and significant. This coefficient is typically well below one so that urban areas grow with their countries but less than proportionately. The coefficient on the log of land area is also positive and usually close to 0.12, implying that a 10 per cent increase in the size of the country increases population in the main city by about 1.2 per cent. The size of the country (holding population constant) is a decrease in population density which might mean an increase in the transportation costs of supplying the hinterland. This result provides our first support for the Kruginan hypothesis.
Our income control usually takes positive values, but the coefficient loses size and significance whenever we also control for the share of labor outside of agriculture. The share of labor outside agriculture is meant to capture the country's state of industrial development and the fraction of the population that is not tied to natural resources." This last variable has a large and significant effect on the size of the main city. We find that a I percent increase in the share of the labor force outside of agriculture increases the size of the largest city by about 2.5 percent. The agriculture and GD? results both suggest that large cities require sonic economic development.
Regression (2) adds the share of trade in GD? to our first regression. This variable is negatively related to the size of the largest city. An increase of 10 percent in the share of trade in GDP leads to a reduction of 6 percent in the size of the main city. Alternatively, a one standard deviation increase in the share of trade in GD? reduces the size of the main city by about 13 percent. This result supports Krugtnan and Livas' [1992J theory against the alternative hypothesis that big cities grow as a result of commerce and trade.
The third regression in Table IV shows our first political variable. This dictatorship dummy (hased on Gastil's indexes of political rights) assigns a value of 1 to countries who do not protect of political rights.
Since our predictions about dictatorship occur because dictatorships ignore the political rights of their citizens, this measure is good for our purposes. Adding this dictatorship dummy to our list of controls, we find that dictatorships have main cities that are about 45 percent larger than those belonging to countries with non-dictatorial regimes? We deal with the possible endogeneity of the trade an4 dictatorship variables in Tables VI and VII. Region dummies are generally excluded from our regressions because we want to include the information contained In interregional variation, but to check robustness we include region dummies in regression (4).
Our three main variables of interest remain significant and large, although the coefficients on trade and politics fall by about a quarter. The coefficient on the Latin American dummy is positive and indicates that countries in this region have main cities that are 40 percent larger than those of other countries.
In regression (5) we add a second political variable to regression (4). The New Democracy dummy was constructed using data from Banks (19731, which contains data fOr a wide cross-section of countries going back to 1815. This variable takes a value of I if the country in question did not have a well functioning and efficient Parliament at the time it became independent, but was democracy between 1970 and 1985." This New Democracy Dummy is intended to capture the effect of political history on the size of the central city.
Regression (5) shows that among the democracies in our sample, those that were dictatorships in the past have central cities that are 40 percent larger than those of countries that were always democracies.
The final regression in Table W Includes the average number of revolutions and coups as a regressor, and an Interaction between this variable and the dictatorship dummy to the previous set of regressors. We find that political instability substantially increases city size in democracies. In those regimes, one extra revolution or coup per year increases the average size of the central city by 2.4 percent. In dictatorial regimes political Instability does not change the main city size.
The first three regressions in Table V examine the trade-city size connection more closely. Regression (7) includes a tariff variable: the ratio of import duties to total imports." We find that import duties do indeed expand the size of the primary city. A one percent increase in the ratio of import duties to imports raises the size of the central city by almost three percent. The import duty effect remains important when we control fOr the quantity of trade and dictatorship in regressions (8) (from Canning and Pay [19931) . The coefficient on the initial density of roads in the country is negative (and the coefficient on government spending stays negative), further indicating that well developed transport facilities lower the size of central cities; The last regression in Table V To examine the results of Table IV more closely, Table VI reproduces regression (5), but allows for the possibility that trade and the dictatorship dummy are endogenously determined. We use three sets of instruments to examine how exogenous changes in the share of trade in GDP and the type of political regime alter the size of the main city:
(1) Regional Political Characteristics: Following Ades and Chua (1993) we use the average number of revolutions and coups in neighboring countries, the average number of per capita political assassinations in neighboring countries, and a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the average Gastil index of political rights in neighboring countries is higher than 3.
(2) Predetennined Political Characteristics: We use the 1960 value of an index of etluiolinguistic fractionalization in the country (from Taylor and Hudson 119721 as in Alesina and Rodrik (1993] ), and a dummy variable that takes a value of I if the country became independent after the end of World War fl.
T (3) Regional Infrastructure: we use the average road density in neighboring countries (from Canning and
Fay 11993]).
Our Identifying assumptions are that these variables affect politics and trade but do not change urban structure directly. We test these assumptions using a Wu-Hausman test of the overidentifying restrictions for the system of equations and find that our assumptions pass these tests.
Regression (13) Regression (15) looks at the effect of the spatial distribution of population on the change in the share of trade in GDP. We find no effect of main city size on trade growth. In regression (16) At it's height, Rome's population probably stood at over 1,000,000 inhabitants, or approximately 2 percent of the Roman empire's population. Earlier cities had been large but none had never grown to one half that size.'3 There is dispute over Rome's population. In this discussion we accept Garnsey's 119881 population figures and his claim that 130-30 B.C.E., when Rome's population grew from 375,000 to 1,000,000, was the period of Rome's greatest growth.1' During this time, five distinct political events directly and indirectly increased the incentives to come to Rome: (I) the empire expanded into Gaul and the eastern provinces of Asia, Bithynia, Pontus, Cilicia and Syria, (2) Pompey declared that all conquered land was the property of the city's government, (3) the Gracchi's Sempronian law and then the Clodian law extended the grain distribution to a large number of the citizens as long as they me to Rome, (4) Sulla extended the Roman citizenship to all of the inhabitants of Italy, and (5) internecine warfare made the hinterland Aindamentally unsafe. As a result of events (3) and (4) transferred from the conquered provinces to the masses of Rome were the circuses (and other games) which cost fortunes to produce Intl were put on at their height more than 50 times per 'ear.
Eventually, Julius Caeser restored stability and reduced the grain distribution around 45 B.C.E. The growth of Rome then began to slow. Rome's growth illustrates how an ability to extract from the hinterland and an inability to quell revolts at borne, together lead towards overconcentration in the capital. Trade and industry may bave helped Rome expand, but Rome's huge unemployment levels, the overwhelming size of the stat&s bureaucracy and the massive wealth redistributions make it clear that Rome's size was, ultimately, a result of governmental size and transfers. The timing of Rome's expansion suggests that liberal grain distributions funded by foreign conquests fueled Rome's growth.
London 1670. A. D.
For almost 1200 years after Rome's disintegration in the fifth century C.E., Europe had only two cites with 400,000 or more inhabitants: Byzantium, with a population of bdween 400,000 and 600,000 from 600-1000 C.E., and Cordoba with a population of approximately 400,000 in 1000 C.E. [Bairoch 1988J . stnicture and the most control over its provinces (Brewer [19901) .
Several Thdor monarchs (Henry VII, Henry VIII and Elizabeth I) were strong, but the Stuarts (James I and Charles I), who ruled during the period of London's greatest growth, were England's most dictatorial kings and had a particular disregard for the rights of the hinterland supposedly protected by parliament.
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Smart instability is also easily seen; Charles I lost his thrown and his head in the Civil War. As in our model, these dictators responded to Instability by collecting more income from the weak provincial areas and relatively less from the dangerous capital. Examples of Stuart redistribution from provinces to capital include James l's novel imposition of naval taxes (ship moneys) on the hinterland. James I also recreated trade monopolies (which had been eliminated by Elizabeth I) and allocated them to the great London merchants. Stuart mercantilisni can be seen as a policy enriching the capital's traders and producers at the expense of the hinterland's consumers (Ekelund and Tollison 1981] . Instability also increased London's size because the mid-l7th century civil war made much of the hinterland unsafe. It is unclear if London's growTh was more strongly based on trade or politics, but we believe that the evidence points to the importance of both factors.
6.3. Edo. 1700 A. D.
While both Paris and London appeared like colossi upon the map of Europe in 1700, neither city was nearly as big as the Asian capitals of China and Japan. Peking had reached a population of 600,000 by 1500, and was the largest city in the world until London surpassed it in 1830. Japan's capital, Edo (modem Tokyo) was almost as large as Peking around 1700 in absolute terms and much larger when viewed relative to Japan's much smaller population. Excluding military personnel. Edo's population lies between 500,000 (Sansom 19631 to I million (Seidensticker 1980J , or between 2 and 4 percent of Japan's population. The high productivity of rice economies has been the traditional explanation of Asian urbanization, but while this nutritional edge might explain urbanization in general, it does not explain its concentration in a single city.
The period of Edo's greatest growth was between 1380, when Edo was a castle surrounded by a village, and 1700, when it became the second largest city in the world. Edo's growth derives from its establishment as the Shogunal capital by Tokugawa leyasu. Ieyasu (along with Odo Nobun4a and Hideyoshi) unified Japan in the late 16th century. Over the 17th century, Ieyasu's descendants amassed a monopoly of political and economic power far beyond that of any European king. By 1690, the Shogun had rice revenues of 14.68
kob, approximately half of the country's produces and more than six times the Shogun's revenues In 1598." The Tokugawa shoguns stripped rival chieftains of their authority and limited the power of the samurai (following the path of Hideyoshi and his great sword hunt). At the end of the civil war, 100,000 ronin (unemployed soldiers) were left lordless; many of these were induced to come to the military capital.
The dalmyo (local lords) and the shogunate cut soldiers off from their local power bases and encouraged samurai to take their feudal dues as annuities and move elsewhere (mainly to the capital (Sansom 1963J) .
Despite the power of the Shogun, some instability (such as the Shimabara uprisings of 1638-39) remained
In the hinterland and further encouraged people to move to the safety of the capital.
There is some support for die Knigman-Livas trade hypothesis In the story of Edo. The Tokugawa Employment in the service sector expanded by 1.2 million (600 percent). Agricultural employment actually declined over the 1960-1970 period.
Industrial growth was concentrated in Mexico City because the capital was the major market for most goods as well as the major supplier (Krugman and Livas's thesis). Mexico's industrialization followed the big push type pattern [Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny 19891 ; urban concentration facilitated the coordination of demand and supply. Import-substitution policies made it more necessary for consumers (especially firms consuming intermediate inputs) to locate in Mexico city close to domestic suppliers because foreign suppliers 20 were excluded from the country. Industrial growth also thrived in the capital because Mexico City was the center for foreign capital and ideas.
Political factors behind Mexico's concentration are also quite strong. Mexico has a nominally federal government, but all real power Is concentrated In the capital. Even regional governors spend most of their time within the capital out of fear of losing political Influence [Kandell 1988 ]. The Mexican government is also particularly susceptibleto unrest in the capital. Kandell [1988] describes a typical episodeof rural-urban migrants coming to the outskirts of the central city and beginning as squatters on the land. These migrants then choose a political leader or cac1que who agitates against the leading party (the PR!). The government responds by giving the migrants title to the land and providing them with some kind of minimal infrastructure (paid for with taxes levied on the country as a whole). The migrants then become loyal supporters of the PR!. This description of an oligarchic regime paying off local rioters with transfers seized from remote regions of the country is highly reminiscent of Rome. It suggests that politics, as well as trade, contributed to Mexico City's size.
VI!. Conclusion Krugman and Llvas' (1992] hypothesis that urban concentration Is negatively related to international trade is born out in the data. Good Internal transportation infrastructure also decreases urban concentration.
However, our time series and Instrumental variables results cast doubt on the causality in these correlations.
Trade and cities are connected, but it may be that urban concentration is causing low levels of trade, not that low levels of trade induce concentration.
Our political results are stronger than our results on trade. They display a robust causality running from dictatorship to urban centralization. Urban giants ultimately stem from the concentration of power in the hands of a small cadre of agents living in the capital. This power allows the leaders to extract wealth out of the hinterland and distribute it in the capital. Migrants come to the city because of the demand created by the concentration of wealth, the desire to influence the leadership, the transfers given by the leadership to quell local unrest and the safy of the capital. This pattern was true in Rome, 50 B.C., and ills true in many countries today.
1. These three authors' evidence differs from ours because of (1) their use of self-construcéed political variables, (2) their emphasis on explicitly spatial O.e. degree of local spending or autonomy) institutions (we look at more basic features of governments), (3) their small sample size (less than forty) and restrictive time period (Henderson uses only 19741976) . In addition to this, endogeneity problems are much more serious for their political variables. As one measure of government centralization, these authors use the share of local governments In total government expenditures. This variable Is dearly a function of the distribution of population in space. A further difftrence with out work. is that we only look at the nation's largest city. This change was necessary to increase sample size.
2. The relationship between trade and concentration can be non-monotonic. When foods deteriorates rapidly in transit, people must live near food supplies, as they did before the domestication of pack ninml5 (Bairoch 11988] ).
3. Protectionist policies might also encourage urban concentration by promoting the growth of importcompeting activities which are dependent on essential inputs found only in the capital; central cities might be -places for avoiding tarifft (New York City and Buenos Aires were both centers of smuggling);
finally, proximity to central government might be particularly important when exemptions to tariffs are being handed out or the spoils of protection are being distributed.
4. Hoselitz [1955] argued that there were a class of 'parasitic' cities involved In rent-seeking. Olson (1982] emphasizes the role of government distribution policies in determining thesize of cities. He suggests that the capital will grow when transportation and communication networks are poorly developed in rural areas; this, he claims 'makes it more costly and difficult for those in rural areas to mobilize political power...'. Williamson (1991] gives an elegant description of the policies put in place transferring resources from the hinterland to the capital. Technically, these theories are all about the nation's capital not the nation's largest city. Since the nation's largest city is its capital in more than 90% of the countries in our sample, we have decided to gloss over this distinction.
5. We would get identical results if the degree of dictatorship measured the size of the rents to be allocated and the degree of instability measured the ability of local political actors to access those rents.
6. Our results could be generalized to allow revolts starting in both areas as long as the capital has a comparative advantage in unseating the government.
7. Both probabilities are conditional on the other change of government not occurring.
8. An urban agglomeration is an area comprising a central city or cities surrounded by an urbanized area, and is dose to the U.S. definition of 'consolidated statistical metropolitan area.' 9. Averages were used rather than running all four observations as a panel, primarily because appropriate panel techniques are only usable If we put some structure on how lagged values of county characteristics change current urban concentration. We were unwilling to make the assumptions needed for that structure.
10. These standard errors do not differ greatly, however, from those obtained by OLS. We also tried running the regressions weighting them by population.
II. This variable was chosen instead ofshare of the population in manufacturing to increase sample size.
Using a pure manufacturing variable for a smaller subsample of countries did not change the results.
12. Our results are not particularly sensitive to the choice of the cutoff point in the Gastil index for deciding whether a country Is a democracy or a dictatorship. More detailed examination of the data suggests a slightly nonlinear relationship between city size and political rights, where countries in the [4,5) interval have, other things equal, the largest central cities. While our results don't change if we use a non-linear continuous dictatorship variable, we find our dummy variable easier to interpret. Our cutoff of3 follows Perotti (19911. 13. For a those countries that were never a colony or that became independent before 1815, we used the 1850 observation if available or the 1900 one.
14. We also used an alternative measure provided in Lee 119921, who uses the actual average tariff rate on imported inputs, intermediate and capital goods in or around 1980. This variable (which was available for a sub-sample of 67 countries) also entered strongly positive and significant in our regressions.
15. U reached a population of approximately 24,000 around 2800 B.C. Babylon may have had as many as 300,000 inhabitants under Hammurabi in 1700 B.C. According to Bairoch, Alexandria (the largest Hellenic city) never exceeded a population of 320,000. India and China had big population centers several centuries before the common era. All of these centers were associated with extremely powerful empires. Bairoch (19881 streises the role of international trade in supporting these cities. However, as much as Babylon was a trading city, it was even more a center of taxation and tribute. Herodotus estimates that 213 of Babylon's revenues caine from non-Assyrian provinces. Babylon's main function was as a base fur military force and political stability, not as a center for trade.
16. Rome's population is disputed. Bairoch estimates the population at about 800,000 by the second century A.D. based (in part) on the list of recipients of state grain (Garnsey also uses this source to get estimates at over I million). In contrast, using structural densities as an estimation device, Russell (1985) provides us with a lower bound of approximately 200,000 at the height of Imperial Rome. While there are problems with any estimate, the mass of evidence (ranging from the structural expansion of Rome in this period to the eyewitness discussions of overcrowding during the 130-50 period) suggest that Rome was growing rapidly during the late Republic.
17. The grain distributions were not completely egalitarian. Some fee was required for the distribution (under the earlier Sempronian Law but not under the later Clodian Law) and slaves and others of the poor were excluded. But the grain was essentially a dole meant to appease the politically active elements of Rome (Scullard 19591. 18 . A particularly striking feature of London's growth between 1600 and 1670 is the dominance of deaths over births. Wrigley and Schofield 119811 report that London had 600,000 more burials than baptisms between 1600 and 1675. Given a natural deficit of this magnitude, net migration to the capital must have been more than 875,000 people.
19. This should be compared with a national production of 25 million kob and with the nutritional needs of one Japanese of one koku per year. This means that 2.56 million people could be fed by the rice revenues owed to Ieyasu alone. (1970) (1971) (1972) (1973) (1974) (1975) (1976) (1977) (1978) (1979) (1980) (1981) (1982) (1983) (1984) (1985) (1)
(4) (5) City (1970 City ( -1985 (7) (8) Dictatorships are countrS whose average Gastil index for the period is higher than 3.
Standard errors in parenthesis.
